Living with Fulani Folks

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I was born in Jos South, but I am native to Irigwe land in Bassa Local Government Area of Plateau State. I attended primary school and the first three years of secondary school in Jos South. I spent the last two years of secondary school in Irigwe land.

During my time in Irigwe land, I met a classmate with whom I became close. He was Fulani by tribe and spoke Irigwe fluently—Fulani people have a talent for understanding languages with ease. Of course, he also spoke Fulani, Hausa, and English, which he learned in school; this is common among children born in that part of Nigeria.

My friend felt that our school lacked the resources to help him achieve his dream of becoming a medical doctor. It was ironic: I had left my previous school because I felt it lacked the resources to help me fulfil my ambition in the sciences. I tried all I could to persuade him to stay, especially since we had become inseparable. We were so close that he often took me to his ruga home, where we would spend weekends. Eventually, he left for Science School, Toro, in Bauchi State. I remained in Irigwe land in Plateau State, pursuing my dream of building a solid science foundation. I had no intention of becoming a medical doctor, preferring instead to acquire a solid science foundation before making a decision. I knew, however, that I would not study Medicine or Pharmacy—careers that teenagers were crazy about.

I achieved my dream of a solid foundation, just as he did. That was why we met again at the University of Jos. I was studying geology, while he was not in medicine. Instead, he had enrolled in one of the biological sciences, a field he disliked. He later moved to the University of Maiduguri to study Veterinary Medicine.

It was at the University of Jos that the bond of brotherhood became unmistakable between us. Each time we wanted to communicate in secret, we spoke in Irigwe. That was when I learned that if you grow up in the same locality, you become brothers in a foreign land. I felt this too when I was in Port Harcourt. Whenever I became homesick, I would go to the Presidential Hotel in Port Harcourt, meet the Hausa people selling their wares there, and spend some time talking about Jos. Though he was not Irigwe by blood, he felt that Irigwe land was home to him. And indeed, we never felt that Fulani people were strangers until the devil paid a visit and poisoned our minds.

After graduating from our respective universities, we met a few times and then lost contact. That was in the mid-nineties. When the security situation deteriorated on the Plateau and elsewhere across the country, I started thinking about him. He seemed to have vanished so completely that none of our schoolmates could say where he had last been seen or heard of. Thanks to social media, someone posted his phone number on a Whatsapp group for our former secondary school classmates. Posting his number on that group meant that his whereabouts were unknown not only to me but to many others. That was my interpretation of seeing his number alone on Whatsapp.

I quickly copied and saved the number. When I called for the first time, he did not answer. I tried again a couple of days later. This time, he answered. He told me he had been living in Kaduna and practicing his profession. I asked why he never visited. His answer was, in his own words, “the thing is that your land has become what it has become.” Then he asked which part of Jos I lived in. I told him. He then promised that whenever he was passing through, he would give me a call.

Since then, he has not called—probably because he has not visited, or because he has visited but his schedule made it impossible.

This is how things have become messy between native Plateau communities and settlers—so messy that the feeling of brotherhood has eroded. In its place, there is now only hatred and enmity

 

Fulanis Risking It All

              Jeopardizing the Influence They Already Hold

Nuhu Ribadu and Nasir El Rufai Source: AI

During the administration of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007), there were three cabinet members I greatly admired. They were Dorothy Akunyili, who headed NAFDAC; Nuhu Ribadu, who headed the EFCC; and Nasir El-Rufai, who served as Minister of the Federal Capital Territory. I admired them for their wisdom, courage, and strong sense of patriotism, qualities that helped them perform effectively in their roles.

I hoped they would continue to serve in government in various capacities. I particularly wished to see them become governors of their respective states. For El-Rufai, I believed he had the potential for even higher responsibilities. My wish for him was fulfilled when he became governor of Kaduna State. Ribadu made several attempts to become governor of Adamawa State but was unsuccessful. Akunyili later served as Minister of Information under President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua before her untimely death, which I deeply mourned.

Over time, however, some of El-Rufai’s actions as governor raised questions in my mind. The persistent security challenges in southern Kaduna, combined with his administration’s approach to appointments — which many viewed as exclusionary — led me to question how inclusive and equitable his leadership was. He maintained that appointments were based purely on merit. This claim was difficult to reconcile with the educational achievements and available talent in Southern Kaduna, which has historically performed well in education compared to the northern part of the state.

The escalation of violence in the southern part of the state further deepened my concerns. At the peak of the banditry problem, El-Rufai stated that the government had paid some bandits to leave Nigeria’s borders. Later, his comments about the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) remaining silent due to the exclusion of Christians from his government, and his suggestion that this approach could be applied more broadly, added to the perception of religious and ethnic bias.

Ribadu, after facing political challenges, was eventually appointed National Security Adviser. In this role, he described the Fulanis involved in security issues as “brothers” who could not simply be cut off, comparing them to a part of the body. He also mentioned that some had been released from detention. These statements raised questions about consistency in how security-related cases are handled across different ethnic groups.

Both El-Rufai and Ribadu are Fulanis who have built distinguished careers and are often seen as refined and cosmopolitan. Their respective positions on issues involving Fulani individuals involved in crime have led some observers, including myself, to perceive a pattern of ethnic sympathy. Given the serious nature of the offences — murder, kidnapping, arson, rape, and others — such perceptions contribute to growing concerns about ethnic favouritism in addressing national security challenges.

Historically, Fulani communities were generally well-regarded across Nigeria. However, the recent wave of violence linked to some Fulani groups has strained relationships. While Fulanis already occupy significant positions of influence in the country, the on-going conflicts risk undermining the acceptance and respect they previously enjoyed. In today’s world, maintaining absolute control over diverse groups is extremely difficult. If current tensions continue, Fulanis may ultimately lose more influence and social goodwill than they stand to gain.

 

From Farmers-Herders to Miners-Herders

Source: Seaarts

Towards the end of the third quarter of 2009, there was a problem in Wase Local Government Area of Plateau State. The administration of Jonah Jang, Governor of Plateau State at the time,   was evacuating some herdsmen who were immigrating to Plateau in large numbers.

In the previous couple of years, Plateau has recorded some of the most deadly conflicts that pitched native Plateau tribes on one hand and the settler Hausa-Fulani tribes on the other. The Jang administration, whose regime was marred by these conflicts, was afraid that immigration of these herdsmen, some of whom are said to have come from as far as Mali would only complicate matters.

Despite the effort of the Jang administration to move these herders back to where they came from, it did not work. The herders chose a strategy.  When they returned, it was deadly. Armed with some of the most deadly weapons, they would visit innocent native villages in the dark of nights and kill as much as they can. Whoever survives is compelled to move out, having no assurance that he will be protected in future. The climax was the death of two legislators, one a senator, the other a member of the Plateau State House of Assembly in 2012. This was the start of what was dubbed the Farmers-Herders Conflict.

The phrase wasn’t fair to the farmers. It suggested there was a conflict between the two sides, when actually the farmers were helpless and unarmed people who never knew where the herders were coming from let alone attempt to attack them in retaliation. It was a case of a lion and a gazelle, a case of a deadly bully and the weak.

The herders, seeing that nothing was done by the authorities to deter them, started casting their murderous nets to cover wider regions such that people who had argued in their support became their worst victims, as the killing fields broaden to include Benue, Kaduna, Zamfara  and Niger provinces.  In Plateau State alone, the attacks had displaced close to a hundred villages as at the year 2019.

They herders were initially interested in grazing lands. Now, they have become more daring and more ambitious, driving people away from villages that are rich in minerals, succour to the villagers who find themselves living arm and leg in contemporary Nigeria. In Zamfara and Niger States, the conflicts is said to be fuelled by gold deposits underneath the affected villages. In Plateau State, considered the nucleus of solid mineral mining in Nigeria, the story is the same. In Bokkos, Barkin Ladi, Wase, Kanam and Jos South, all of which are rich in a diversity of mineral deposits, the attackers wait until your mining shafts reach the depth of the targeted deposits before they launch attacks, displacing everyone and returning to scoop the deposits.

The attacks, rather than slowing down, are becoming more vigorous, accentuating the weaknesses or nonchalance of authorities. It has gone beyond just grazing farms to minerals and wealth at large. Everything gets messier.